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Introduction
On average, about 20 percent of Medicare patients discharged from 
hospitals in the United States will be readmitted to a hospital within 
30 days.1 These readmissions cost the Medicare program an estimated 
$12 billion a year and may indicate poor quality of care when the 
readmission was potentially preventable.2 Two primary factors are often 
cited as likely contributors to high rates of readmission among Medicare 
beneficiaries: 
•	 First, Medicare pays hospitals based on diagnosis-related groups, 
or DRGs, which allow a single payment for services related to a 
specific diagnosis and not the actual level of services required for 
a particular patient.3 Inherent in this DRG-based payment system 
is an incentive for hospitals to deliver necessary care at or below 
the DRG rate. In 2007, the Medicare program transitioned to the 
use of Medical Severity DRGs to better reflect the acute health 
care needs of Medicare beneficiaries.4 While this change increased 
reimbursement rates, the incentive to treat patients at or below the 
MS-DRG rate remains, as no reimbursement is provided for the 
cost of care delivered beyond the MS-DRG rate.5  If a hospital 
discharges a patient before it is medically appropriate, the patient 
is more likely to return to the hospital for additional care that may 
be more costly, due to exacerbation of the underlying condition(s).6 
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•	 Second, there is often a lack of communication between physicians 
or other health professionals delivering care in the hospital and a 
Medicare beneficiary’s primary care physician, other physician, or 
outpatient setting.7 This can lead to conflicting or additional care, 
necessitating readmission.8 
In its June 2007 Report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) classified many hospital readmissions as 
potentially preventable.9 For example, MedPAC suggested that hospitals 
could reduce readmission rates by better coordinating prescriptions and 
educating family members on appropriate methods of home care.10 
MedPAC also proposed making hospital readmission rates public to 
encourage hospitals to lower their rates as well as changing the Medicare 
payment system to eliminate the early discharge incentive.11  
Given the active role the Aligning Forces for Quality 
Alliances play in quality improvement and public 
reporting of provider performance information, 
the Alliances are uniquely positioned to work 
with hospitals to reduce potentially preventable 
readmissions and provide meaningful information 
to consumers and patients concerning hospital 
readmission rates.  —See page 3 for details
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Based on these recommendations, Congress included the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) in the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).12 The Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS) issued the final rule implementing the 
HRRP on August 18, 2011.13 The Alliances participating in the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Aligning Forces for Quality initiative are in 
an ideal position to educate hospitals and consumers about HRRP and 
inform efforts to reduce readmissions for Medicare patients. This note 
will explain the framework of the HRRP based on the statute and the 
CMS final rule and discuss the implications for Alliance members. 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
and Quality Improvement Program
Overview
The HRRP will reduce Medicare payments to “applicable hospitals” 
that have an excessive readmission rate for the “applicable conditions”14 
(these and other key terms are defined below). CMS will calculate the 
payment reduction by applying an “adjustment factor” to the base-
operating DRG payment that a hospital would receive without the 
HRRP.15 Further, the HRRP requires the Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to collect 
and publish readmission data from “specified hospitals” on the Hospital 
Compare website.16 
The ACA includes a Quality Improvement Program (QIP) along with 
the HRRP to help hospitals that struggle to reduce their readmission 
rates.17 The QIP allows the Secretary to pair hospitals with poor 
readmission rates with a patient-safety organization (PSO) for the 
purpose of lowering readmission rates.18 
Key Terms and Definitions
•	 Applicable Hospital: The ACA defines “applicable hospital” 
as all hospitals except children’s hospitals, certain cancer and 
research centers, and hospitals that provide primarily long-term, 
rehabilitative, or psychiatric care.19 Applicable hospitals include 
those participating in a Medicare reimbursement demonstration 
project, but the Secretary may exempt these hospitals if their state 
demonstrates the existence of a state program designed to reduce 
costs and improve quality.20 
•	 Applicable Condition: Starting in 2013, the HRRP will apply to 
readmissions for Heart Failure (HF), Acute Myocardial Infarction 
(AMI), and Pneumonia (PN).21 These conditions are prevalent and 
costly, and their incidence can be tracked using measures endorsed 
by the National Quality Forum (NQF)—thus fulfilling the 
criteria established in the ACA for applicable conditions.22 CMS 
will consider adding additional conditions in 2015.23 
•	 Readmission: CMS defines readmission as the admission of a 
patient to a hospital within thirty days of their discharge from a 
hospital pursuant to one of the applicable conditions.24 
•	 Base-operating DRG Payment: The ACA defines base-operating 
DRG payment as the amount a hospital would normally receive for 
the discharge of a Medicare patient.25 The amount does not include 
certain Medicare payments made to teaching hospitals, low-volume 
hospitals, urban hospitals, rural hospitals, small community 
hospitals, and hospitals serving low-income populations.26 
•	 Adjustment Factor: The ACA establishes the adjustment factor as 
the greater of a floor value or the ratio of “aggregate payments for 
excess readmissions” to “aggregate payments for all discharges.”27 
The ACA defines “aggregate payments for excess readmissions” as 
the product of: (1) the “excess readmissions ratio” minus one; (2) 
the number of admissions for each applicable condition at a hospital 
during a specified time period; and (3) the base operating DRG 
payment for the condition.28 The ACA defines “excess readmissions 
ratio” as the ratio of “risk-adjusted actual readmissions” to “risk-
adjusted expected readmissions.”29 Readmissions will only be 
included in this ratio if the number exceeds a minimum established 
by the Secretary.30 The ACA defines “aggregate payments for 
all discharges” as the total of all DRG discharge payments at a 
hospital during the specified period.31 
•	 Specified Hospital: All hospitals, including hospitals exempted 
from the readmission penalty, must submit data regarding their 
readmissions to the Secretary.32  However, entities or states may 
submit the data on behalf of specified hospitals.33 
•	 Administrative and Judicial Review: The ACA prohibits 
administrative and judicial review of the readmission measures, 
base-operating DRG payment, and adjustment factor formulas.34 
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Implications for the Aligning Forces For 
Quality Alliances
Given the active role the Aligning Forces for Quality Alliances play in 
quality improvement and public reporting of information about provider 
performance, they are uniquely positioned to work with hospitals to 
reduce potentially preventable readmissions and provide meaningful 
information to consumers and patients concerning hospital readmission 
rates. The following issues will be important for Alliances to consider 
and address as appropriate. In addition, Alliances might consider or 
continue working with private payers to implement programs that 
reinforce the Medicare HRRP. 
Control over Readmissions
The CMS definition of readmission includes readmissions that are 
unrelated to the initial discharge and over which hospitals have little or no 
control.35 For example, if a hospital discharges a pneumonia patient and 
that patient later returns to the hospital due to severe injuries sustained 
in an accident, the readmission counts for purposes of the HRRP, 
even though the hospital had no control over the circumstances that 
necessitated the readmission. Additionally, the readmission is attributed 
to the discharging hospital even if the patient is readmitted to a different 
hospital.36 Thus, if an ambulance carries the pneumonia patient from 
the site of the accident to a different hospital, the discharging hospital 
will be penalized for the readmission and will not be able to lessen the 
penalty amount by providing care for the acute injury.
Given the limitations imposed by CMS’s definition of readmission, 
Alliances should work with hospitals in their communities to monitor 
their ability to control readmissions and consider remedies if the penalty 
in practice presents an unnecessary burden that does not achieve the 
desired result of reducing potentially preventable readmissions.
Risk-adjustment Readmission Measure
The HRRP could have a disparate impact on hospitals that serve largely 
minority populations or those of low socioeconomic status (SES) 
because the risk-adjusted readmission measure does not include race or 
socioeconomic status.37 Research indicates that readmission rates for 
minorities are higher than those for whites, but whether that disparity 
is the product of poorer quality of care in hospitals that predominantly 
serve minorities or of increased disease prevalence is unclear.38  
On the one hand, if higher readmission rates are due to a sicker minority 
population, then the failure to adjust for race-related risk would 
effectively penalize hospitals that provide care to large numbers of 
minority patients. On the other hand, if the readmission rate disparity 
is due to poorer quality of care in hospitals that serve large minority 
populations, then inclusion of race and socioeconomic status would 
undermine the efficacy of the HRRP by shielding poorly performing 
hospitals from the penalty. CMS erred on the side of the latter view, but 
recognized that the selected measure could have a harmful impact.39 
Alliances should work with hospitals in their communities that 
predominantly serve racial minorities or persons of low SES to monitor 
the effect of the HRRP and report any adverse results to CMS. 
Applicable Hospital and Payment Calculation
CMS will refine and clarify the definitions of “applicable hospital,” 
“base-operating DRG payment amount,” and “aggregate payments for 
excess readmissions,” as well as establish the adjustment factor, in an 
upcoming cycle of rulemaking.  Because the HRRP will take funding 
away from hospitals while simultaneously asking them to implement 
costly measures to lower readmission rates, CMS must consider the 
operating margin of hospitals when defining these terms.40 Failure to do 
so could result in the HRRP penalizing a hospital that lacks the means 
to reduce their readmission rates.  The Alliances are in an ideal position 
to understand the complex cost and efficacy considerations posed by 
the HRRP and therefore should comment on these issues through the 
rulemaking process. 
Reducing Readmissions
Congress appropriated, in the ACA, $20 million for the Center for 
Quality Improvement and Patient Safety (the Center), part of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), to conduct 
research on quality and safety issues.41 Specifically, the ACA directs 
the Center to research “practical methods” of reducing readmissions 
for the purpose of establishing “practice recommendations.”42 The 
Center has not released practice recommendations to date and has not 
indicated they are forthcoming.  Consequently, hospitals will have little 
guidance as they begin to implement readmission reduction methods in 
preparation for the 2013 penalty.  
The Alliances are well-positioned to provide information and practical 
recommendations for reducing readmissions based on their own quality 
improvement efforts. Alliances can do this by publishing a guidance 
document on implementation methods that focuses on issues such as 
cost-effectiveness, hospital size, and patient demographics. Additionally, 
Alliances can open lines of communication so that hospitals may learn 
from the successes and failures of others and facilitate the development 
and implementation of best practices. 
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